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While no one denies that science depends on epistemic values, many philosophers of science have
wrestled with the appropriate role of non-epistemic values, such as social, ethical, and political values.
Recently, philosophers of science have overwhelmingly accepted that non-epistemic values should play a
legitimate role in science. The recent philosophical debate has shifted from the value-free ideal in science
to questions about how science should incorporate non-epistemic values. This article engages with such
questions through an exploration of the environmental sciences. These sciences are a mosaic of diverse
fields characterized by interdisciplinarity, problem-orientation, policy-directedness, and ubiquitous non-
epistemic values. This article addresses a frequently voiced concern about many environmental science
practices: that they ‘crowd out’ or displace significant non-epistemic values by either (1) entailing some
non-epistemic values, rather than others, or by (2) obscuring discussion of non-epistemic values alto-
gether. With three detailed case studies e monetizing nature, nature-society dualism, and ecosystem
health e we show that the alleged problem of crowding out emerges from active debates within the
environmental sciences. In each case, critics charge that the scientific practice in question displaces non-
epistemic values in at least one of the two senses distinguished above. We show that crowding out is
neither necessary nor always harmful when it occurs. However, we do see these putative objections to
the application of environmental science as teaching valuable lessons about what matters for successful
environmental science, all things considered. Given the significant role that many environmental sci-
entists see for non-epistemic values in their fields, we argue that these cases motivate lessons about the
importance of value-flexibility (that practices can accommodate a plurality of non-epistemic values),
transparency about value-based decisions that inform practice, and environmental pragmatism.
 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Philosophers of science have long recognized the role of values
in science (Rudner 1953). Shared epistemic values, such as consis-
tency, scope, fruitfulness, generality, and simplicity, are indis-
pensable to the scientific enterprise itself (Kuhn 1962, 1977). They
are the basis for the rules that determine what constitutes
acceptable scientific practice. While no one denies that science
depends on epistemic values, many philosophers of science have
wrestled with the appropriate role of non-epistemic values, such as
social, ethical, and political values (see Alexandrova 2018; Brownd School of Historical, Philo-
sity, Wrigley Hall, 800 Cady
oches).2013; Douglas 2013; Elliott and McKaughan 2013; Elliott and
Willmes 2013; Longino 1990).
While the value-free idealdthe view that science should be
insulated from non-epistemic values and that value-ladenness
compromises objectivitydfigured prominently among many phi-
losophers of science during the mid-twentieth century, most phi-
losophers of science today accept that some non-epistemic values
have a legitimate role to play in science. Under the right conditions,
objectivity and value-ladenness can be reconciled (e.g.,
Alexandrova 2018; Elliott and Steel 2017). The debate has thus
shifted away from issues regarding the value-free ideal and towards
questions about how some non-epistemic values can be incorpo-
rated into the scientific enterprise itself.
This article engages with such questions by exploring the
environmental sciences, the focus of this Special Issue. These sci-
ences are a mosaic of diverse fields characterized by inter-
disciplinarity, problem-orientation, policy-directedness, and
1 See Martinez-Alier and Røpke (2008a), (2008b); Røpke (2005).
2 Each of these techniques has shortcomings. For details, see Heal (2000a;
2000b) and Barbier (2011).
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address a frequently voiced concern about many environmental
science practices: that they ‘crowd out’ or displace significant non-
epistemic values by either entailing some non-epistemic values,
rather than others, or by obscuring discussion of non-epistemic
values altogether. For instance, does assigning monetary value to
some parts of nature crowd out the putative intrinsic value of na-
ture? Is the concept of ‘ecosystem health’ problematically value-
laden for environmental science? We analyze concerns about
crowding out arising in three different contexts and ask what they
teach us about the environmental sciences.
Evaluating the overall success of the environmental sciences
requires understanding and addressing this putative problem.
While other philosophers of science, such as Miles MacLeod and
Michiru Nagatsu (2016), focus on the epistemic values or collabo-
rative gains resulting from the interdisciplinary exchange that
characterizes the environmental sciences, one might reasonably
suppose that even if an environmental science were calibrated for
excellent predictive power, explanatory scope, and reliability, many
complementary questions would remain about the various ways in
which non-epistemic values can and should be incorporated. Even
the most epistemically favorable environmental science remains
subject to the criticism that it might displace significant non-
epistemic values.
We show that the alleged problem of crowding out emerges not
from the ivory tower, but from active debates within the environ-
mental sciences. As such, this article is driven by three detailed case
studies, focusing on (1) the concepts of ‘natural capital’ and
‘ecosystem services’ in the interdisciplinary field of ecological
economics, (2) a type of nature-society dualism (NSD) presupposed
by social-ecological systems (SES) research, and (3) the use of
ecosystem health measures to direct environmental policy. In each
case study, critics have either charged or implied that the scientific
practice in question displaces non-epistemic values in at least one
of the two senses distinguished above. Critics argue, in particular,
that assigning parts of nature with monetary value precludes
assigning these same parts of nature with socially significant non-
instrumental value, that NSD devalues either nature or society, and
that measures of ecosystem health may conceal underlying debates
about distinct non-epistemic values.
We take these criticisms seriously but argue that critics unjus-
tifiably take the cases to prove toomuch. Reconsidering these cases,
we show that crowding out is neither necessary nor always harmful
when it occurs. However, we claim these putative objections to the
application of environmental science as teaching valuable lessons
about what matters for successful environmental science, all things
considered. Given the significant role that many environmental
scientists themselves see for non-epistemic values in their fields,
we argue that these cases motivate lessons about the importance of
value-flexibility (that practices can accommodate a plurality of
non-epistemic values), transparency about value-based decisions
that inform practice, and environmental pragmatism. We believe
that these lessons complement epistemically-oriented studies in
the philosophy of science, such as MacLeod and Nagatsu’s (2016)
discussion of the conditions conducive to achieving the “prob-
lem-solving goals” of collaborations, or Inkpen and DesRoches’
(2020) analysis of the predictive and explanatory benefits of
coupled, ecological-economic models.
Our article is structured as follows. In the next section, we
discuss three case studies where the criticism of crowding out has
been raised. We derive a few lessons in response to this criticism in
different contexts. In Section 3, we draw on resources in the science
and values literature to argue that the pertinent issue for envi-
ronmental science to address is value-inflexibility and non-
transparency. Finally, in Section 4, we conclude by discussinghow our analysis complements existing work on successful envi-
ronmental science.
2. Three case studies
As suggested above, critics have often worried that certain
environmental science practices crowd out or displace significant
non-epistemic values, and some take this to be an argument against
the usefulness or success of these practices. In this section, we
provide three case studies to argue that such a conclusion is un-
justified. Each case is followed by a lesson that we believe the case
supports. Each case builds on the lesson from the last. The first case
demonstrates that non-epistemic values are not always displaced
in the way that critics sometimes contend, insofar as crowding out
is sensitive to context; the second demonstrates that modelling
practices can, in a given context, be more flexible with regard to
non-epistemic values than some scholars have recognized; and the
third case demonstrates the importance of transparency about
non-epistemic values. We thus take these cases to make separate
but related points.
2.1. Does monetizing nature crowd out the intrinsic value of
nature?
Ecological Economics is an interdisciplinary science that
emerged as a formal institution in the 1980s, with its origins
extending back to the biophysical economist, Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen’s (1971) The Entropy Law and Economic Processes.1 Over
the last few decades, it has become common practice for ecological
economists to assign parts of nature denoted by the concepts of
‘natural capital’ and ‘ecosystem services’ with monetary or eco-
nomic value. These concepts denote a rich variety of active and
modifiable production processes that not only afford human beings
with passive materials to be improved by labor and manufactured
capital, but endows them with production processes that sponta-
neously generate valuable goods and services in a manner that is
relatively detached from intentional human agency (DesRoches,
2018, 2019, 2020).
One classic study concluded that the Earth’s entire biosphere,
including a wide range of services generated by natural capital,
such as the purification of water, nutrient cycling, and the detoxi-
fication of wastes, is worth between $14 and $54 trillion dollars,
annually (Costanza et al. 1997, 2014). Economists have devised a
variety of indirect methods to estimate the economic value of
ecosystem services that have no market price, including
willingness-to-pay surveys, the travel-cost method, replacement
cost, and hedonic indices.2 These techniques appear to show that,
although natural capital and ecosystem goods and services may
possess no market price, they still possess economic value.
What is the motivation for ecological economists and their life
scientist colleagues to monetize nature? Arguably, the central
motivation has been to avoid market failure. The Cambridge
resource economist Partha Dasgupta (2010) worries that if the
economic value of natural capital and ecosystem services is not
explicitly acknowledged, then these so-called ‘natural assets’ will
be mismanaged. Without monetizing nature, the economic value of
natural capital and ecosystem services will be underestimated or,
worse, ignored altogether. If, for example, the economic value of the
‘pollination services’ afforded by pollinator species remains unac-
counted for, then this economically significant process could be
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value of pollination services afforded by pollinator species is
properly estimated, this information can be used to manage it like
any other capital asset: to optimize its rate of return over time.
While assigning ecosystem services with economic value has,
over the last few decades, become widespread, there have been
many methodological and philosophical objections to this prac-
tice.3 Here, we consider only one such objection: monetizing parts
of nature denoted by natural capital and ecosystem services crowds
out the putative non-instrumental (or intrinsic) value of nature.
Indeed, critics have long argued that assigning parts of nature with
economic value involves assigning instrumental value to nature
and this practice is objectionable because ‘commodifying nature’
risks crowding out nature’s intrinsic value (see Gómez-Baggethun
and Ruiz-Pérez 2011).
Themost recent version of this argument is due to the ecological
economist Peter A. Victor (2020). Victor argues that monetizing
nature entails assigning it with instrumental value and this practice
invites an exploitative attitude towards nature. We are told that the
practice is objectionable because it “denies, or minimizes, the
ethical value of nature itself, of individual and connected ecosys-
tems, of non-human species and their members. These are all just
capital to be valued for their utility to humans” (Victor 2020, p. 6).
Our question is the following: does assigning parts of nature
with economic value (and paying for ecosystem services) neces-
sarily crowd out significant non-epistemic values, such as the
intrinsic value of nature? By considering literature on the moral
limits to free markets, we will argue that the answer to this ques-
tion is no. Instead, we maintain that scholars who are both for and
against the monetization of ecosystem services would do well to
recognize their shared goal of conserving the parts of nature
denoted by natural capital and ecosystem services and judge the
merits of any proposed strategy to achieve this goal, including the
monetization of nature, on their efficaciousness, which is to say, the
best empirical evidence available.
Many political philosophers, including Elizabeth Anderson
(1990; 1993), Margaret Radin (1996), Michael Sandel (2012), and
Michael Walzer (1983), have argued that there are moral limits to
freemarkets because the distribution of goods should be consistent
with their social meaning. On the whole, these scholars argue that
the market is not a neutral mechanism for distributing goods and
services but involves treating goods in a certain way: as commod-
ities. And, because not all goods in human life should be treated as
such, these scholars argue that there is a class of goods that should
not be for sale.
Consider, for example, friendship. Sandel (2012) argues that
friendship is not the kind of good that can be bought and sold
without degrading or corrupting it. As he puts it, “the money that
buys the friendship dissolves it, or turns it into something else”
(2012, 94). One might be able to pay another person for the ‘ser-
vices’ that would be expected from a friend, but the friendship it-
self, if it is a genuine relationship between individuals, is not the
kind of thing that can be bought and sold without corrupting it.
Many who object to the monetization of ecosystem services and
payments for ecosystem services object for the same reason that
Sandel raises with respect to friendship. Making payments for
ecosystem services involves treating parts of nature as a mere
commodity e as something that possesses instrumental value
alonee and this is problematic because the parts of nature denoted
by natural capital and ecosystem services possess intrinsic value
and, therefore, ought to be respected and not treated as a3 On the prevalence of this practice, see Costanza et al. (1997); Costanza et al.
2014; Barbier 2011; Helm 2015; Daily 1997; Kareiva et al. 2011.commodity. Monetizing nature is incompatible with this putative
proper mode of valuation.
In response to this argument, one might recognize that the so-
cial meanings of goods are frequently contested (Satz 2010).
Different individuals and moral communities tend to assign a wide
variety of social meanings and values to the same goods. Without a
widespread consensus on the social meaning of specific goods, such
as natural capital and ecosystem services, such meaning cannot be
expected to serve as a benchmark for deciding when some item
should not be for sale.
Setting aside the question of whether parts of nature really do
possess intrinsic value, we might ask whether assigning nature
with economic value and accepting payment for ecosystem services
e the commodification of nature e crowds out the putative
intrinsic value of nature. Indeed, there appears to be only a tenuous
connection between the social meaning, including intrinsic value,
that people assign to goods and the distribution of goods by the
market. While scholars such as Anderson, Walzer, Radin, and San-
del, worry that buying and selling certain socially significant goods
might crowd out other important ways of valuing such items,
others have argued that “the market price is rarely the direct
expression of our evaluative attitudes towards goods” (Satz 2010, p.
82).
Take, for example, the buying and selling of sacred texts. Does
the atheist bookstore owner who sells religious texts undermine
the special value assigned to the Bible for devout Christians? When
such a text is treated as a mere commodity by some people, does
this treatment undermine other significant ways of valuing such
items? On the contrary, buying and selling sacred texts in the
marketplace does not seem to displace the special social meaning
among those for whom it matters. Instead, the same item can be
treated differently by market participants involved in the same
transaction. The atheist bookstore owner can treat a religious text
as a mere commodity, believing that the item has no value apart
from its contribution to her profit margin, while this attitude has no
effect on the religious buyer’s valuation of the same object.
The same conclusion follows for ‘payments for ecosystem ser-
vices’ (Farley and Costanza 2010). Consider another example. Jim
owns 500 acres of land in Costa Rica. His land consists of virgin
rainforest replete with natural springs. Jim, a preservationist, be-
lieves that some parts of nature, including his rainforest, possess
intrinsic value. While Jimwould, other things being equal, prefer to
preserve all of his rainforest, other things are not equal. He must
make a living from his land to support his family. So, Jim gives
serious consideration to his next best option: selectively logging his
forest and producing some organic coffee beans for a lucrative
export market destined for Western Europe.
Fortunately for Jim, a new option becomes available before he
wields his axe. After hearing that Jimwas planning to clear a part of
his rainforest, which would entail redirecting the water flowing
from his springs, Jim’s neighbor, Amy, makes Jim an offer. Amy
offers to pay Jim to ensure the water which currently flows from his
springs to her property continues unabated. Unlike Jim, Amy as-
signs no intrinsic value whatsoever to nature. She believes non-
human nature possesses mere instrumental value. While Jim hes-
itates to accept payments from Amy, nothing makes him happier
than the prospect of supporting his family and conserving his 500-
acre rainforest paradise simultaneously. Jim accepts Amy’s offer. As
a consequence of this transaction, both parties are made better-off
by their own subjective standards.
Both of the foregoing examples reveal that the social meanings
assigned to some goods need not be underminedwhen those goods
are treated as commodities. In the second example, assigning
ecosystem serviceswith economic value and accepting payment for
such services does not necessarily crowd out significant modes of
Fig. 1. "Press-Pulse Dynamics" (PPD) Framework (Collins et al. 2011, p. 353).
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Amy’s payments and this transaction does not undermine Jim’s
mode of valuation with respect to his land. Jim continues to assign
intrinsic value to his parcel of paradise and gets paid to conserve it,
too. While some might criticize Amy for an inappropriate attitude
directed towards nature, her attitude and actions (payments) do
not extinguish Jim’s evaluative judgment.
With that being said, crowding out non-epistemic values can
still occur. Consider an alternative version of the example of Jim and
Amy, in which Jim not only believes that his rainforest has intrinsic
value, but that monetizing it would necessarily devalue it. In this
scenario, Amy’s monetization plan would crowd out Jim’s strict
mode of valuation. Moreover, broad social or governmental
acceptance of the monetization of nature would, at the social level,
crowd out Jim’s mode of valuation as well.
Alternatively, suppose that Jim is still willing to accept the
monetization of his rainforest under certain conditions, but that
these conditions are not met. In particular, broad social or
governmental acceptance of the monetization of nature forces Jim
to transition some of his land to coffee production in a manner that
is incompatible with his preferred mode of valuation. Jim may, of
course, maintain his view that some parts of nature have intrinsic
value, but if we look beyond the individual level to the social level,
we observe that the prevailing norm or policy may crowd out the
intrinsic valuation of nature and so force Jim to compromise on his4 Of course, it remains an open question whether the foregoing instance of so-
cially crowding out is objectionable. The decision to monetize nature at the social
level may be the result of a legitimate deliberative democratic decision-making
process, for instance.values. This example shows that monetizing nature might some-
times be more accomodating of different non-epistemic values at
the individual level than at the social level, and that a given practice
may therefore crowd out non-epistemic values in one context but
not another.4
This case reveals that those concerned with the commodifica-
tion of nature crowding out socially significant modes of valuation
might be better served by redirecting their efforts towards
answering a more pragmatic and empirical question: how effective
is a given strategy, including the monetization of nature, for
conserving parts of nature in a given context? After all, most
environmental scientists and scholars who are concerned with the
commodification of nature and ecological economists who mone-
tize nature do in fact share one and the same goal: to help conserve
the objects denoted by the concepts of natural capital and
ecosystem services. As the economist Geoffrey Heal (2000a, 125)
recognizes, “[the monetization of nature] is neither necessary nor
sufficient for conservation. We conserve much of which we do not
place economic value, and we do not conserve much that we value
economically” (2000a, 125). Rather than ruling out any conserva-
tion strategy a priori, environmental scientists and critics would be
better served by initially remaining neutral to the conservation of
natural capital and ecosystem services, realizing that their conser-
vation is not necessarily guaranteed by monetizing nature or
assigning nature with intrinsic value.
2.2. Nature-society dualism
If our first case study demonstrated that crowding out does not
always materialize as critics contend and is instead context-
sensitive, then our second case study demonstrates that, even in
Fig. 2. Example of social-ecological systems (SES) conceptual model (Schlüter et al. 2012: 224).
6 Classificatory NSD is different from recognizing the distinct concepts of nature
and society, because distinct sets can overlap. Classificatory NSD requires non-
overlapping sets.
7 Our definitions of these two types of dualism do not necessarily correspond to
definitions of ‘dualism’ in other fields. Our typology of NSD is also not exhaustive.
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accommodate a variety of different non-epistemic values (and so
demonstrates value-flexibility). We make this point by shifting to
another field in the environmental sciences: social-ecological sys-
tems (SES) research.
SES research is a growing field of interdisciplinary research
(Colding and Barthel 2019). SES researchers generally aim to inte-
grate the social and ecological sciences in order to improve un-
derstanding of the interconnections between social and ecological
systems, the idea being that an improved understanding of social-
ecological interactions can serve the non-epistemic aim of
improving environmental outcomes (e.g., Berkes and Folkes 1998;
Schlüter et al., 2012). For example, many SES researchers argue that,
if conservationists lack an understanding of the ‘human side’ of
environmental problems, they will inevitably develop conservation
plans that remain unimplemented (Ban et al., 2013), as in ’paper
parks,’ for instance (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2006).
SES research is also characterized by its reliance on conceptual
models to facilitate interdisciplinary integration.5 Conceptual
models are typically qualitative and frequently take the form of
diagrams that depict the interacting components of an SES (Figs. 1
and 2). The value of the models is that they provide researchers
with an initial formulation of a target system’s state variables,
processes, etc. (e.g., Hinkel et al., 2014). Crucially, the main com-
ponents are understood to be subsystems of an SES, and the sub-
systems are classified as either natural (e.g., ecosystems) or social
(e.g., institutions) (e.g., Alberti et al., 2011; Anderies et al., 2004;
Bennett et al., 2016; Collins et al., 2011). Thus, conceptual models in
SES research show both that and roughly how distinct natural and
social subsystems are linked. Conceptual modelling is, then, a
qualitative version of what MacLeod and Nagatsu (2016) call the
“coupled-model framework,” insofar as it directs researchers to link
models from different disciplines e in particular, ecology and
various social sciences e together via the models’ respective inputs5 In the SES literature, conceptual models are also sometimes called “conceptual
frameworks” (Alberti et al., 2011; Berkes & Folke 1998; Binder et al., 2013; Collins
et al., 2011) or “conceptual maps” (Ostrom 2007).and outputs, rather than building entirely new models with com-
ponents that transcend the ecological and social sciences. Such
coupling facilitates the integration of existing subsystem-specific
expertise and helps define research questions that can be
approached by collaborating natural and social scientists, who are
designated as experts on their respective subsystems (Alberti et al.,
2011; Binder et al., 2013; Heemskerk et al., 2003).
An important feature of SES research for our purposes is that its
conceptual models exhibit a form of nature-society dualism (NSD),
even as they depict causal interactions between social and
ecological subsystems. Specifically, these models exhibit what we
call classificatory NSD e that is, the treatment of nature and society
as non-overlapping, or disjoint, sets.6 That the conceptual models
exhibit classificatory NSD is evidenced, first, by their depiction of
nature and society as separate subsystems, and, second, by the
modularity of the corresponding sub-models. In short, if the sub-
models are separate and separable, then they represent sub-
systems that do not overlap, even if they causally interact. Classi-
ficatory NSD can be usefully contrasted with what we call causal
NSD e that is, the treatment of either nature or society as exoge-
nous in causal interactions with the other side of the dualism (see
Inkpen 2017a).7 In fact, SES research can be concisely characterized
as a field that utilizes classificatory NSD, via coupled models, to
overcome causal NSD, with the aim of improving environmental
outcomes (see Liu et al., 2007).
Yet critics of NSD have long argued that NSD has non-epistemic
costs.8 We specifically respond to two anti-NSD arguments in this
case study, labelling them the natural devaluation argument and the8 To be sure, arguments against NSD in environmental ethics do not typically
identify SES research as their target. Nevertheless, anti-NSD arguments are often
general in scope and for that reason apply to SES research, perhaps unintentionally,
as long as SES research is dualistic in the contested sense. Insofar as we identify one
context e namely, SES research e in which these anti-NSD arguments fail, we
provide a (perhaps neglected) counterexample to general arguments against NSD.
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argument are right, and classificatory NSD is their intended target,
then conceptual modelling in SES research may, due to its classi-
ficatory NSD, crowd out the proper valuation of either nature or
society, regardless of its epistemic benefits.9 We argue, however,
that classificatory NSD, at least as it occurs in the context of SES
research, accommodates the proper valuation of both nature and
society simultaneously.
According to the natural devaluation argument, NSD is objec-
tionable in most, if not all, contexts, because it leads to the inap-
propriate devaluation of nature (Meyer 1999). For example, Moore
(2016a; 2016b) has argued that NSD is a ‘thought-structure’ that
allows people to conceive of themselves as separate from nature,
which in turn makes people more likely to devalue nature. For
Moore (2016a), an important instance of NSD is what he calls
“Green Arithmetic.”Green Arithmetic is the view that, “Society plus
Nature ¼ History” (Moore 2016a). Does Green Arithmetic target
classificatory NSD in particular? According to this view, the causal
interaction of nature and society is given, which suggests that
Moore is not objecting to causal NSD but rather classificatory NSD.
That classificatory NSD is the target is also suggested by howMoore
describes the alternative: “human organization as something
more-than-human and less-than-social” (Moore 2016a). Given that
Moore’s alternative entails that the categories of nature and society
overlap, it is plausible that what he thinks is objectionable about
Green Arithmetic is its assumption that nature and society are non-
overlapping sets (i.e., classificatory NSD). Notably, Leopold (1949)
similarly argued that the inappropriate devaluation of nature
stems from a society’s failure to think ‘ecologically’ and, in partic-
ular, the failure to think about humans as part of rather than
separate from an ecological community.10
By contrast, according to the social devaluation argument, the
problemwith NSD is that it crowds out a proper valuation of society
rather than nature. Typically, the argument takes one of two forms.
Either the claim is that NSD leads to the inappropriate devaluation
of humans (Cronon 1996; Pollan 1991), insofar as it “leaves precisely
nowhere for human beings actually to make their living from the
land” (Cronon 1996, p. 13) and so conceives of humans as unnatural
and unethical invaders (White 1996), or it is that NSD leads to the
inappropriate devaluation of non-pristine environments, which are
taken to be ‘spoiled’ by human influence and so less-than-natural
and less valuable (Berry 1995; Cronon 1996). In either form, this
argument is often directed at the dualistic wilderness ethic, ac-
cording to which what is best, from an environmental-ethical
perspective, is to minimize human influence on the environment
and to protect pristine natural environments from non-natural
human influence. Crucially, the wilderness ethic depends on a
sharp separation of nature from society, sometimes with physical9 It is not always clear whether critics object to classificatory NSD. If critics of NSD
intend to object to classificatory NSD, then our argument functions as an objection.
If critics intend only to object to causal NSD, then our argument in this section
functions as a call for greater conceptual clarity in arguments against NSD. We think
the former is a plausible interpretation of some critics’ arguments, but either way,
our argument more importantly illustrates the value-flexibility of a scientific
practice, as well as how the practice’s value-flexibility is responsive to the field’s
requirements and goals.
10 Granted, it is not as clear that Leopold’s target was, or was exclusively, classi-
ficatory NSD. On the one hand, Leopold objected to foresters who were “quite
content to grow trees like cabbages, with cellulose as the basic forest commodity,”
and with little regard for ecological causal factors (Leopold 1949, p. 221). “With
little regard for ecological causal factors” suggests causal NSD. On the other hand,
Leopold contrasted “man the conqueror” with “man the biotic citizen” (Leopold
1949, p. 223) a distinction both of function and of membership. The distinction
of membership suggests classificatory NSD.barriers, regulations, or at least lines on a map e in short, classifi-
catory NSD.
However, despite these criticisms of classificatory NSD, in SES
research it is a tool for avoiding causal NSD, which is objectionable
on environmental-ethical grounds for other reasons. In particular,
classificatory NSD, via SES researchers’ coupled-model framework,
facilitates tractable empirical research on social-ecological in-
teractions. This research reveals interdependencies between nature
and society, conceptualized as distinct subsystems of an over-
arching SES, rather than as exogenous disturbances to each other,
which is what causal NSD would imply. SES research thus dem-
onstrates that devaluing nature may lead to undesirable social
outcomes, insofar as people depend on ecosystem services for their
well-being (e.g., Rockström et al., 2009). At the same time, SES
research can also reveal that crowding out the proper valuation of
society may lead to undesirable ecological outcomes, because, for
example, the efficacy of conservation often depends on a degree of
perceived legitimacy in affected communities (e.g., González et al.,
2008; Young et al., 2016). Moreover, SES research can reveal both of
these facts simultaneously and so facilitate the proper valuation of
both nature and society, insofar as what benefits nature benefits
society and vice versa. If anything, the interdependencies that SES
research reveals, and that causal NSD would obscure, make it
difficult to devalue either nature or society entirely.
Classificatory NSD in SES research is laden with non-epistemic
values. It is, after all, motivated by the non-epistemic aim of
improving environmental outcomes. Yet this case study demon-
strates that classificatory NSD, at least within the narrow context of
SES researchers’ conceptual modelling practice, is not tied to any
oneway of valuing nature or society.11 First of all, in much the same
way that the monetization of nature does not always crowd out
certain ways of valuing nature, classificatory NSD does not always
crowd out the proper valuation of either nature or society. Of
course, win-win scenarios for both nature and society are not al-
ways possible in conservation (Hirsch et al., 2010; McShane et al.,
2011). It would, therefore, be a problem if classificatory NSD al-
ways required the equal valuation of nature and society, as that
would make SES research less relevant to the difficult decisions of
environmental governance. However, when trade-offs between
nature and society are unavoidable, SES research can, first, help
reveal them by identifying causal interactions between natural and
social subsystems (Ban et al., 2013). Also, because SES research
keeps nature and society separate in its conceptual models, nature
and society can be assigned different values, within the limits
suggested above. Classificatory NSD thus facilitates, or avoids
crowding out, a variety of unequal valuations of nature and society,
reflecting a range of different priorities, as long as neither nature
nor society is devalued outright.12
Classificatory NSD in SES researchers’ conceptual models thus
displays a constrained, though consequential, ‘flexibility’ with
respect to certain non-epistemic values. We refer to this feature as
value-flexibility to contrast it with value-freedom. A value-flexible
scientific practice e such as classificatory NSD in this context or
ecosystem health, as we argue below e is value-laden but not
committed to any one non-epistemic value. It may, for example, be
compatible with any non-epistemic value or, instead, only some11 Classificatory NSD may, however, be objectionable in other contexts. Our
argument in this section is specific to the context of SES research.
12 We say more about both trade-offs and win-win, or ‘convergence,’ scenarios in
Section 3.
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practice is not value-laden at all.13
Value-flexibility promises a degree of methodological freedom
without requiring true value-freedom, but as we argue next
through a case study of ecosystem health assessment, value-
flexibility alone is insufficient for avoiding all worries about
crowding out.2.3. Assessing ecosystem health
Assessing the health of ecological systems has a long history.14
Early in the twentieth century, when communities were
conceived as superorganisms, assessing their health and pathology
seemed natural: ecologists, like medical doctors, could offer diag-
nosis and prognosis for their diseased superorganismal patients
(Adams, 1913). During mid-century, Leopold’s popular idea of the
land health in A Sand County Almanac (1949) became a mainstay of
the environmental movement and environmental ethics. But it was
in the late 1980s, when ecological health entered the burgeoning
environmental sciences, that its discussion becomes relevant for
this article.
Combining Leopold’s conservationism with the new systems
ecology (Holling 1973; Odum et al., 1979), environmental scientists
at this time championed ecosystem health as a foundational
concept for environmental management. They saw it as helpful for
integrating disparate environmental monitoring and assessment
practices that spanned the social, natural, and health sciences. As
Schaeffer et al. (1988) wrote in a seminal article,
Environmental decision making is limited and is often funda-
mentally flawed, because of the inability to relate available data
in an ecosystem context. [.] Physicians, as diagnosticians,
provide a model for the environmental biologist monitoring the
health of an ecosystem. The diagnostician does not collect data
without a purpose. Testing is done to measure specific param-
eters which have known ranges, indicating the state of health.
Environmental biologists must approach ecosystem analysis in
the same way. (1988, 445)
One aim of ecosystem health science was to create a diagnostic
manual summarizing the aetiology of ecosystem degradation,
providing straightforward guidance to managers as they attempted
to improve health by alleviating “disease,” “dysfunction,” or
“distress syndrome” (Costanza et al., 1992; Costanza and Mageau
1999; Rapport et al., 1998). This represented an intentional break
from past management objectives that emphasized compositional
restoration, such as the return to a “natural” species composition. In
contrast, ecosystem health was functionally defined, a healthy
ecosystem being one that possessed certain capacities, such as for
resilience in the face of damage and for supporting ecosystem
services, like nutrient cycling or waste absorption. Although con-
troversy remains, as discussed below, the project was successful
insofar as ecosystem health assessments are now a staple of envi-
ronmental science (as evidenced by journals like Ecosystem Health
and Sustainability).13 We say more about the types of research questions that the concept of value-
flexibility could inspire below.
14 Aspects of this history are described in Rapport et al. (1998), Scoville (2011), Loo
(2011) and Inkpen (2017b).
15 Besides value-ladenness, there are other potential issues with ecosystem health
concepts, such as whether this use of health is metaphorical, that have long his-
tories of debate (see: Calow 1992; Callicott 1995; Jamieson 1995; Shrader-Frechette
1997; McShane 2004; Odenbaugh 2010). We will not discuss them here.What makes the discussion of ecosystem health assessments
relevant for our purpose is their value-ladenness.15 Proponents of
ecosystem health assessment are explicit that value judg-
mentsdjudgements that certain things are good and bad for an
ecosystemdare unavoidable when defining ecosystem health
(Rapport 1989). But many critics are not primarily concerned with
value-ladenness per se.16 They are concerned that ecosystem health
assessments crowd out the discussion of non-epistemic values.
Specifically, that ecosystem health is defined in a way that pre-
supposes answers to questions of value that are themselves the
better locus of discussion and debate.
This is sometimes framed in terms of amisuse of the authority of
science: empirical findings are reported as fact without acknowl-
edging the normative assumptions on which the findings depend.
Lackey in a review of ecosystem health writes that, “The most
pervasive misuse of ecosystem health is insertion of personal
values under the guise of scientific impartiality,” and that, “options
for resolving the many ecological policy issues we face depend on
the concept of ecosystem health, but ecosystem health is based on
controversial, value-based assumptions that masquerade as sci-
ence” (Lackey 2001).
Consider a recent claim: that “Microplastics can be ingested by
marine organisms and have the potential to bioaccumulate and
threaten ecosystem health” (Hurley et al., 2018). If ecosystem
health is defined in a value-laden way, critics contend, then this
statistical claim about the connection between microplastics and
ecosystem health presupposes an underlying value judgment in the
definition of health itself. Using Alexandrova’s helpful terminology,
claims about ecosystem health are “mixed claims” in that they
involve both empirical and normative elements (Alexandrova
2018). The perceived danger about ecosystem health claims is not
that they are mixed, but that inattention to the normative character
of these claims presents them as if the underlying normative
judgments are uncontroversial or undebatable. A discussion of non-
epistemic value is crowded out by science: in order for ecosystem
health to be operationalized, underlying value-judgments about
what is good for an ecosystem must be answered in some way.17
What does it mean to say that ecosystem health is defined in a
value-laden way? Consider McShane’s conception of ecosystem
health (McShane 2004): an ecosystem’s health is “a matter of
maintaining the structure and functions that are good for the
ecosystem.” We determine what is good for an ecosystem, she ar-
gues, by asking, “What it wouldmake sense for someonewho cared
for the ecosystem towant for it for its own sake?” This is a question
of value, and depends both on how we define the ecosystem and
what we take to be good for such systems in general. As McShane
(2004) writes,
if one defines an ecosystem as essentially involving certain
characteristic species, then anything that threatens the presence
of these species thereby threatens the existence of the
ecosystem. However, different species can sometimes be func-
tionally redundant. That is to say, they can perform the same
ecosystemic functions, and thus are, from the point of view of
certain ecosystemic processes, interchangeable. So if we define
the ecosystem not in terms of characteristic species but in terms
of, say, energy flow, then the extinction of one species wouldn’t
threaten the ecosystem as long as something else steps in to
perform that same function within the system of energy flow.
It’s possible, then, that under one definition of the ecosystem,
the extinction of a particular species will threaten the very16 Although that worry does arise (see Wilkins 1999).
17 A related concern is raised in Sagoff (2003).
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the ecosystem wouldn’t even be changed by the extinction,
much less threatened by it. (McShane 2004, 243)
In addition to howwe define an ecological system, there is also a
more direct question of what is good for an ecosystem. Is persis-
tence good for an ecosystem? Is increased primary productivity
good? Rapport makes this point by drawing attention to how hu-
man interests might dictate an answer to what is good for an
ecosystem for its own sake:
Specific criteria for ecosystem health are also inevitably influ-
enced by the dominant social and cultural values. For example,
the idea that a healthy system is a stable one arises naturally
enough in a technocratic society where the importance of
control and dependability is paramount. The idea that a healthy
system is a productive one also arises naturally in a society
oriented toward achieving high levels of economic well-being.
(Rapport 1989, 127e8)
The take-away from this is not that ecosystem health is neces-
sarily culturally relative, as Rapport suspects, but only that how we
define what is good for an ecosystem is a normative judgement:
one based on an underlying philosophical debate about value (if we
follow McShane).
Critics, like Lackey, see claims about ecosystem health as
crowding out an important discussion of values: such claims will
not properly acknowledge the role that values have played and such
claims presume answers to questions of value which may be the
better locus of discussion and debate. Consider an example from
Holland (2000, p. 53), who describes Shell’s (UK) proposal to sink
the Brent Spar oil platform into the North Sea. As Holland describes,
A major problem with the proposal was the amount of metals
contained in the tanks and ballast. In an article published in
Nature (1995), Nisbet and Fowler observe that metals abound
naturally on the ocean floor, especially around midocean-ridge
hydrothermal systems. Accordingly, they argue that the metals
of the Brent Spar “would not be out of the ordinary, and indeed
might be beneficial as a mimic of vent activity.” They claim as a
result that “the addition of extra dumped metals would prob-
ably act as a nutrient to the local ecosystem.”
Depending on how health is defined, and how the normative
questions that underlie it are decided (is this good for it or bad?),
the new system could be healthier than the old (for example, if the
Brent Spar increases the capacity for nutrient cycling and that is
considered valuable). Critics contend that such flexibility is a recipe
for exploitation. Ecosystem health crowds out the discussion of
values that really matters, and problematically oversimplifies
environmental decision-making. In this case, the discussion should
be about the benefits and costs of Shell’s proposal for all those
affected (whether human, animal, plant, or ecosystem). Thus, the
discussion, critics have maintained, would be better focused on
descriptions of the potential impact on ecological systems (such as
their functions or composition) and why we value or disvalue those
descriptions (recreational, aesthetic, economic, etc.), rather than on
notions like ecosystem health which must presume answers.
Are these truly problems? And do they undermine the use of
ecosystem health in the environmental sciences? As with ourprevious case study, this case study reiterates the point that prac-
tices in the environmental sciences can be quite flexible with re-
gard to non-epistemic values. But unlike the last case study, where
this was an obvious benefit, here the flexibility itself is drawn on to
support a worry about exploitation. We take these concerns seri-
ously, but think they warrant a lesson other than rejecting
ecosystem health assessments in environmental science.
We think that these worries motivate a lesson regarding the
importance of transparency about the value-based decisions that
inform practice. And we contend that this transparency must be
fostered within the environmental sciences and recognized as an
essential component by those evaluating these sciences. Lackey’s
worries are most compelling within a scientific climate that falsely
sees health assessments as if they do not depend on value-based
assumptions. It is this climate that allows for health assessments
to be exploited by thosewho insidiously conceal their own interests
under the guise of what is presented as impartial science. The
lesson is not to reject all practices that involve value-based as-
sumptions, especially those flexible enough to accommodate many
different values. We believe that our case studies show that this
would require rejecting toomuch. The lesson is to find ways to help
change the scientific climate to one that is appropriately trans-
parent about non-epistemic values (as we discuss further below).
As the previous case study demonstrated, value-flexibility can
be a virtue of practices within the environmental sciences. But, as
this case study has shown, without also fostering transparency
about value-ladenness, this flexibility can itself give rise to
exploitation and to worries about crowding out.3. Analysis
We have argued that crowding out does not always occur as
critics sometimes contend it does in the environmental sciences,
that certain practices in the environmental sciences are sometimes
value-flexible, and that value-flexibility needs to be complemented
with value-transparency in order to avoid crowding out the very
discussion of non-epistemic values. In this section, we explain why
value-flexibility matters in the environmental sciences and how
value-transparency, along with environmental pragmatism, can
help environmental scientists harness value-flexibility.3.1. The problem of crowding out in the environmental sciences
In each of our case studies, scientific practices are laden with
non-epistemic values. This is characteristic of the environmental
sciences generally, even if it is not unique to them. For example,
when the late Michael Soulé defined conservation biology in the
1980s, he defined it partly in terms of a set of normative postulates,
such as “ecological complexity is good” and “biotic diversity has
intrinsic value” (Soulé 1985). And when Peter Kareiva and Michelle
Marvier proposed modifications to Soulé’s vision, they did not
fundamentally criticize the discipline’s value-ladenness but instead
proposed alternative or supplementary non-epistemic values, most
prominently a higher prioritization of human well-being (Kareiva
and Marvier 2012). Moreover, surveys suggest that conservation
scientists largely agree about the importance of non-epistemic
values to their discipline, even if they sometimes disagree about
which non-epistemic values are important (Holmes et al., 2017;
Sandbrook et al., 2019). Of course, conservation science is only one
discipline, but it is exemplary of how well-accepted and explicit
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making these sciences ideal sites for investigating questions about
the actual role of non-epistemic values in science and the appli-
cation of science.18 Our question in this article is one such question.
Again, do practices in the environmental sciences crowd out any
non-epistemic values?
No one should deny that crowding out can happen in the
environmental sciences and beyond.We have ourselves given some
examples, but many others already exist in the literature. For
example, feminist philosophers of science have shown that some
scientific practices display gender bias, in some cases resulting in
what we would call the crowding out of social values like gender
equality (Kourany 2003; Richardson 2010). Other philosophers of
science have identified trade-offs between non-epistemic and
epistemic values, such as predictive accuracy, affordability, and
speed (Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Potochnik 2015). Scientists
themselves also sometimes explicitly acknowledge facing trade-
offs between competing non-epistemic values. In conservation
science, for example, Sahotra Sarkar (2002) has argued that there
are multiple concepts of biodiversity, but that not all of them serve
conservation science’s goal of maximizing biodiversity preserva-
tion under constraints; conservation scientists must therefore
choose between different concepts of biodiversity on the basis of
the concepts’ differing non-epistemic value alignments. And even
once conservation scientists choose a concept of diversity, they
need to choose an indicator that can represent that diversity. Many
indicators are available, from species diversity to life zone diversity,
and each aligns with particular non-epistemic values rather than
others (Sarkar and Margules 2002).
But arguments that particular scientific practices are associated
with particular non-epistemic values typically treat the strength of
the association as binary: either there is an association or there is
not. However, our case studies show that the association is not
binary. We therefore suggest that environmental scientists and
their critics should re-direct their attention towards the invariance,
so to speak, of the relationships between certain scientific practices
and certain non-epistemic values. In other words, we should ask
questions such as: How invariant are our practices?19 Can they
incorporate multiple non-epistemic values? Can they incorporate
the non-epistemic values that matter, given the context of their
use?20 In effect, what critics of monetizing nature, NSD, and
ecosystem health argue is that the alleged non-epistemic value18 This is not to say that the environmental sciences are representative of all
sciences. What is ideal about the environmental sciences as sites of investigation is,
first, that explicit non-epistemic values are easier to study and, second, that dis-
ciplines that accept a role for non-epistemic values are more likely to be open to
suggestions for how to manage those values.
19 Consider some possibilities. A scientific practice may, strictly speaking, be
value-flexible but also be laden with a particular non-epistemic value in almost all
contexts or, instead, most of the time in a single context. Alternatively, a scientific
practice may be value-flexible and compatible with a wide, though finite, range of
non-epistemic values. Wide-ranging compatibility may, in turn, vary by context. For
example, a practice could be largely invariant in one context but hardly at all in
another.
20 We thank an anonymous reviewer for challenging us to think more deeply
about the relationship between practices and non-epistemic values, and for offering
clarifications that help us see this as a matter of invariance across contexts.
Although we cannot fully address them here, this invariance raises a host of
questions for further exploration. As this reviewer pointed out, one concern may be
about the tendency of a certain practice to crowd out certain values, even if it is
flexible enough to accommodate many values. They suggested that many argu-
ments against the ecosystem services approach take this form. Our concern in this
paper was simply to explain the concept of value flexibility and why it matters, but
as this reviewer rightly points out, there are many further questions to address
(though we cannot do so here). Another further question, also inspired by this
reviewer, is the extent to which we should view value-flexibility, in general, as a
scientific virtue.displacements of these practices are invariant enough to produce
trade-offs, or crowding-out effects, across many different contexts
or consistently in a single context. Our case studies show, instead,
that the relationship varies by context and within contexts.
3.2. Why value-flexibility matters in the environmental sciences
There are at least two reasons to think that value-flexibility is
important to the environmental sciences. First, trade-offs between
epistemic and non-epistemic values or between competing non-
epistemic values can potentially force environmental scientists to
compromise on their epistemic or non-epistemic goals. It is
therefore essential for environmental scientists to have an accurate
understanding of the value-flexibility, or lack thereof, of their
various practices, so that researchers can make informed decisions
about competing goals, in some cases avoiding trade-offs
altogether.
Second, value-flexibility can allow for a degree of stakeholder
choice in environmental policy-making, as required by democratic
norms and perhaps environmental science itself.21 Pielke’s four
“idealized roles” for scientists in policy-making can be used to
articulate this point (Pielke 2007). The four roles are (1) the “Pure
Scientist,” (2) the “Science Arbiter,” (3) the “Issue Advocate,” and (4)
the “Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives.” According to the Pure
Scientist model, scientists should conduct research without any
regard for or involvement in policy-making. By contrast, according
to the Science Arbiter model, scientists should assist policymakers,
albeit while remaining policy-neutral and only answering purely
epistemic questions. The Issue Advocate model abandons such
neutrality, recommending that scientists advocate particular pol-
icies. Finally, according to the Honest Broker model, scientists
should, like Science Arbiters, try to be policy-neutral but, unlike
Science Arbiters, be willing to answer questions about the con-
nections between epistemic and non-epistemic goals. As Pielke
puts it, “[T]he Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives seeks explicitly
to integrate scientific knowledge with stakeholder concerns in the
form of alternative possible courses of action” (Pielke 2007, p. 17).
Which of these models is most appropriate for the environ-
mental sciences? The Pure Scientist model would be an awkward
fit, given that the environmental sciences are often policy-directed.
Also, it is difficult to apply the Science Arbiter model to the envi-
ronmental sciences, because although the model requires engage-
ment with policy-making, it also requires value-free science, which
is difficult to come by in the environmental sciences. Environ-
mental scientists are left, then, with the Issue Advocate and Honest
Broker models, both of which recommend that scientists deliver
value-laden advice to policymakers.
Some environmental scientists appear to endorse the Issue
Advocate model, but that position remains controversial (Nelson
and Vucetich 2009). For instance, conservation scientists have
long debated whether they should advocate policies that protect
biodiversity (Marris 2006; Scott et al., 2007), with some critics
worrying that advocacy could undermine conservation scientists’
credibility (e.g., Lackey 2007). But another worry about the Issue
Advocate Model concerns democracy. As Heather Douglas points
out with respect to science more generally, “Regardless of which
theoretical ideal of democracy one might hold, it is not acceptable
for a minority elite to impose their values on the general populace”
(Douglas 2005, p. 156). It would indeed be an imposition in the case
of the environmental sciences, because it is rarely feasible for
stakeholders to exit the relationship by disregarding environmental21 Stakeholders are essential to many aspects of ‘sustainability science’ (Nagatsu
et al. 2020).
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typically (at least partly) epistemically dependent on environ-
mental scientists (see Holst and Molander 2014), while at the same
time facing complex environmental problems that demand solu-
tions informed by science. Thus, stakeholders are, in a sense,
vulnerable to environmental scientists’ value judgments and so
count as “affected interests,” who are, as such, entitled to a degree
of influence over the decisions that affect them (see Fung 2013;
Goodin 2007; Warren 2017). Of course, these decision-making
rights may not extend to scientific research itself (Collins and
Evans 2007), but the bare minimum is for stakeholders to decide
which non-epistemic values inform policy (Intemann, 2015;
Schroeder, 2019), a domain in which environmental scientists
have no claim to expertise in the first place, and inwhich values are
frequently contested (Odenbaugh 2003). This minimal democratic
requirement rules out the Issue Advocate model and leaves the
Honest Broker model as the only option that is applicable to the
value-laden environmental sciences but also consistent with
democratic norms.
The connection between the Honest Broker model and value-
flexibility is that value-flexibility, when available, may serve that
model. In particular, a scientific practice that is value-flexible may,
in a specified context, be compatible with a plurality of non-
epistemic values and so a variety of stakeholder preferences.
There is, then, a prima facie democratic reason for environmental
scientists to identify and utilize existing instances of value-
flexibility and perhaps even to favour value-flexible practices
when multiple practices are available, in order to avoid undemo-
cratically ‘setting the agenda’ on non-epistemic values. Classifica-
tory NSD in SES researchers’ conceptual modelling, for instance,
leaves the valuation of nature and society open to a range of
stakeholder preferences.22
Of course, value-flexible practices are not always available,
owing to such factors are “distributed epistemic agency” and
“generatively entrenched methodological choices,” which embed
non-epistemic values in the “nooks and crannies” of research in
fields such as climate science and biomedicine, where non-
epistemic values can consequently become difficult even to iden-
tify, let alone modify (Winsberg 2012; Winsberg et al., 2014). Such
inscrutability is particularly likely to occur in interdisciplinary
research, where value-laden scientific practices and products are
iteratively exchanged across disciplinary boundaries, potentially
accumulating non-epistemic baggage over time. At the same time,
our case studies show that, even under these circumstances (in the
highly interdisciplinary environmental sciences), a degree of value-
flexibility is sometimes possible. Perhaps even when it is lacking, it
should serve as an ideal that scientists sometimes attempt to foster.3.3. Harnessing value-flexibility
If value-flexibility is itself valuable to the environmental sci-
ences, then one might want to know how environmental scientists
could better identify and promote it. Here, we reiterate the need for
value-transparency and offer another suggestion as well, namely, to
adopt some of the methodological precepts of environmental
pragmatism, which may encourage environmental scientists and
their critics to embrace scientific practices’ ties to non-epistemic22 Of course, it is a finite range. And that may be a feature, rather than a bug, of
any given value-flexible practice, if it is desirable for the practice to exclude socially
unacceptable values. Classificatory NSD, for instance, makes valuing either nature
or society at the total expense of the other difficult, and that may be a good thing.
What is desirable, then, is not value-flexibility tout court but value-flexibility with
specified limits.values without imposing those values upon stakeholders or
themselves.
Environmental pragmatists characteristically reject highly
theoretical debates in environmental ethicsdfor example, between
anthropocentrism and biocentrismdand the related “top-down”
application of environmental-ethical theories to real-world envi-
ronmental problems (e.g., Light 2009). Their alternative is meant to
be ‘bottom-up’ and practical, with an important prescription being
that environmental ethicists should start their work with the
empirical fact of environmental-ethical diversitydthat is, the fact
that not everyone agrees about environmental-ethical theories, and
that such disagreement is unlikely to go away(e.g., Minteer and
Manning 1999). The task, then, according to environmental prag-
matists, is to navigate environmental-ethical diversity in order to
improve environmental governance without hoping, against the
odds, to eliminate that diversity. Norton’s “convergence hypothe-
sis” is a case in point (Norton 1991). According to the hypothesis,
environmentalists can, on a case-by-case basis, find common
ground regarding policy, even if they disagree about grand
environmental-ethical theories.
The convergence hypothesis is controversial (Minteer 2009), but
the point that a single policy may, within a specified context,
sometimes serve different goals remains useful regardless. Indeed,
we suggest an analogous idea, namely, for environmental scientists
and others to try to adopt practices that are sufficiently value-
flexible for stakeholders with different environmental-ethical po-
sitions to converge on. To do so, the key is to avoid ruling out any
particular conservation strategy a priori and to redirect efforts to-
wards answering a more pragmatic and empirical question: how
effective is a given strategy, in a given context, at achieving a
common (democratically-determined) environmental goal or, in
case of disagreement, a set of environmental goals? Asking this
question may, if coupled with awareness about the possibility of
value-flexibility, prompt environmental scientists and others to
notice existing instances of value-flexibility through the empirical
investigation of a practices’ non-epistemic effects.
Of course, carrying out this pragmatic project requires not just
value-flexibility but transparency as well. We find Alexandrova’s
three rules for the use of mixed claims to be a good start and we
endorse and recount them here, using ecosystem health as an
illustration (Alexandrova 2018). First, value presuppositions need
to be made explicit. This involves stating explicitly how a measure
of ecosystem health is informed by underlying value pre-
suppositions about what ecosystem health consists in. Second, we
have to work to determine whether a particular measure of
ecosystem health is good at tracking health on every plausible
theory of ecosystem health (or is, alternatively, invariant to
different underlying conceptions of ecosystem health). Since there
are a plethora of different conceptions of ecosystem health, this
seems unlikely. So, third, we have to choose the ecosystem health
measure that best fits with the underlying value commitments of
experts, policy makers, and the people (and animals, etc.) that will
be affected by management decisions that are informed by the
measure. In short, we need to begin with transparency and end
with the pragmatic question. The role of value-flexibility, then, is to
provide more leeway in answering the pragmatic question.4. Conclusion: efficacious environmental science
In the Introduction, we claimed that, in addition to the question
of epistemic success that MacLeod and Nagatsu (2016) address, it is
critical to interrogate non-epistemic values in the environmental
sciences, including the question of whether practices in the envi-
ronmental sciences crowd out non-epistemic values, since overall
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about producing science with desirable epistemic values.
However, if success in the environmental sciences is defined as
both non-epistemic and epistemic, then we are led to the worry
that epistemically successful practices may crowd out socially sig-
nificant non-epistemic values. This is a legitimate concern with
practical implications for the environmental sciences, but our case
studies show that crowding out is not always a debilitating prob-
lem. First, our case study on the monetization of nature among
ecological economists demonstrates that crowding out particular
non-epistemic values does not always occur; instead, it is sensitive
to context. Second, our case study of NSD in SES research demon-
strates that a scientific practice can be value-flexible, even in a
given context. Third, our case study of ecosystem health assessment
demonstrates that, while value-flexibility alone cannot solve the
problem of crowding out, it may if it is paired with value-
transparency.
To be clear, nothing we have argued suggests that crowding out
is never a problem. We have, however, argued that there is some-
times reason for environmental scientists to try to exploit and
promote value-flexibility when possible in order to manage trade-
offs between competing values, and abide by democratic norms
that require stakeholder involvement in setting the non-epistemic
aims of policy-directed science. Alexandrova’s recommendations,
especially regarding transparency, can help with accomplishing
this task. So too can some of the methodological precepts of envi-
ronmental pragmatism, which directs us to work with rather than
against value diversity and to shift our attention to empirical
questions about how well a given practice can in fact promote a
given non-epistemic value in a given context.References
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